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Abstract
We estimate the causal effect of having full health insurance on health care expenditures.
We take advantage of a unique quasi-experimental setup in which deductibles and co-
payments were zero in a managed care plan, and non-zero in regular insurance, until a
policy change forced all individuals with an active plan to cover a minimum amount of
their expenses. Using panel data and a non-linear difference-in-differences strategy, we find
a demand elasticity of about -0.14 comparing full insurance with the cost-sharing model,
and a significant upward shift in the likelihood to generate costs.
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1 Introduction
Health insurance plans usually contain some form of patient cost-sharing such as deductibles
or co-payments in order to mitigate moral hazard effects. The common measure of moral
hazard effects in health insurance is the price sensitivity of health care demand, conditional
on health status (Pauly, 1968; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). The first estimates of this price
sensitivity were obtained in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), which was run
during the 1970s. Aron-Dine et al. (2013) provide an account of the HIE and a re-analysis of
the experimental data within the modern causal analysis framework. Their estimates of the
demand elasticity comparing full insurance with several plans containing different degrees of
cost-sharing are in the range of -0.1 to -0.2. This of course corresponds to the well-known
benchmark estimate of roughly -0.2 reported in Keeler and Rolph (1988).
A major challenge in identifying the price elasticity is the definition of the price. Demand is
usually measured by expenditures for health care, not units of health care services. The price
of an additional dollar spent on health care is then the share of that dollar which the patient
has to pay out-of-pocket. Given the non-linear cost-sharing schedules in most health insur-
ance plans caused by deductibles, co-payments and stop-losses, this marginal price changes as
health care expenditures accumulate during the year. Keeler et al. (1977) derived a model of
medical consumption decisions in the presence of deductibles using a dynamic programming
approach. They demonstrated that the correct price for consumers to use when making health
consumption decisions is the shadow (or effective) price. They also showed that using the
“wrong” price (e.g., the marginal instead of the effective price) leads to biased estimates of
price responsiveness. Ellis (1986) provides evidence that the expected end-of-year price is a
good proxy for the shadow price. However, due to the complexity of the model, the effective
price has not been used in applied work until recently.1 For example, the RAND elasticity
of -0.2 is calculated assuming individuals respond only to the spot price. More recent stud-
1Ellis (1986) is a notable exception.
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ies have assumed that individuals respond to the actual (realized) end-of-year price (Eichner,
1998; Kowalski, 2009; Marsh, 2012). Aron-Dine et al. (2012) provide evidence that the insured
are not myopic and indeed respond to the expected end-of-year price.
In this paper, we sidestep the problem of defining the correct price taking advantage of
panel data, provided by a large health insurance company in Switzerland, combined with a
unique quasi-experimental setup. For a group of individuals (those in the HMO plan), there
was a limited period of time without any cost-sharing. We estimate the behavioral changes
induced by going from some (unknown) positive effective price to price zero, implying a price
reduction of 100%. As a control group, we use individuals within the regular health care plan
of the same insurance company living in the same cities.
The analysis is carried out within the potential outcomes framework. We look at the
average causal effect of having full health insurance, as opposed to cost-sharing. This effect
is defined as the difference between the actual average outcomes (health care expenditures
or incidence of zero expenditures) with full health insurance and the counterfactual expected
outcomes in absence of full insurance. In addition, we estimate the causal effects at different
quantiles of the health care expenditures distribution. The econometric analysis uses the
standard difference-in-differences (DID) estimator and the more recent changes-in-changes
(CIC) estimator proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006). Note that in our case, treatment
(full insurance) occurred in the first observation period (2002), and the no-treatment periods
took place in the following years 2003 and 2004. We interpret this as a ”reverse” DID model.
Having two no-treatment periods allows us to examine our identification strategy because we
should not find any effect in the comparison of the years 2003 and 2004.
Our results suggest a small but significant positive effect of full insurance on expected
expenditures within the HMO group. The estimated effect translates into an elasticity of
-0.14. The probability of having positive health care expenditures is increased by about 7%-
points (from 0.76 to 0.83). This corresponds to an increase by roughly 10%.
Methodologically, the paper most related to ours is Borah et al. (2011). They analyze a
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setup in which one employer in the US changed its policy such that only a high deductible
plan with markedly larger deductibles than before was available for the employees. There
was no such change in the plan offered by the control employer. Both employers operate in
similar communities in close geographic proximity. They estimate both average and quantile
treatment effects of having the high deductible plan on total health care expenditures using the
DID and the CIC estimators. Their estimated causal effect is roughly -10%, but the estimate
is only significant when they exclude the top percentile. From the information given in the
paper it is not possible to compute a price elasticity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly gives some institutional
background, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 provides the econometric framework, and
Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional context
Since the reform of the Swiss health insurance law in 1996, a basic health insurance is manda-
tory for all people living or working in Switzerland (with few exceptions, e.g., staff of inter-
national organizations or diplomats). Coverage is for a rather comprehensive set of medical
services and pharmaceuticals, offered by about 80 private, not-for-profit insurers competing
in a regulated market. Free consumer choice of plan is a distinctive feature of the system.
There is no pre-selection of plans by employers or government agencies. Insurers are obliged
to accept all applicants during annual open enrollment periods. The contracts have a duration
of one year. Premiums are community-rated, not risk-rated. In the baseline contract (referred
to as the regular health care plan), insured individuals enjoy unlimited access to all licensed
physicians and most hospitals in their region of residence. In managed care type plans, access
to health care is through a gatekeeper.
In the regular plan, there was a minimum annual deductible of CHF 230 in the years 2002
and 2003, which was increased to CHF 300 since 2004, and a co-payment rate of 10 percent
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up to a stop-loss at CHF 700 (plus the deductible) per year. The insured can opt for higher
deductibles, which were regulated at 400, 600, 1200 or 1500 CHF during the analysis period.
These are offered with premium reductions, which are fixed percentages of the base premium
or 80 percent of the additional financial risk taken by the consumer (deductible minus 230),
whichever is less. The same deductible levels are typically applied to managed-care plans,
although the health insurance law allows insurers to set zero cost-sharing in those plans. We
will further explore this exemption below. Since all contracts are on an individual basis, there
are no family-related shared deductibles.
Physicians in independent practice are reimbursed fee-for-service according to an admin-
istered fee schedule that is collectively bargained between the providers’ and the insurers’
associations. Hospitals receive per diems for patients treated (the nation-wide introduction
of a DRG system was introduced in 2012). In addition to the mandatory basic insurance,
there are several voluntary supplementary insurance types available. By contrast, these are
risk-rated, and we do not consider them in our analysis.
3 Health insurance data
To make the HMO plan more attractive, the health insurance company CSS offered it without
deductibles and co-payments from 1996 until 2002. In other words, the HMO plan provided full
health insurance. In 2003, after complaints by the HMO physicians regarding above average
health costs generated by CSS-insured patients (HMO practices also treated patients from
other insurance companies), CSS introduced the same cost-sharing instruments as in their
other plans. This introduction of cost-sharing provides a possibility to estimate the causal
effect of full health insurance on health care demand.
CSS provided data for four large Swiss cities (Zurich, Basel, Berne, and Lucerne) where the
HMO plan was on offer. The data cover the years 2002 to 2004. Prior to 2002 the data were
not available in comparable quality due to changes in the electronic billing system. Hence, we
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confine ourselves to the last year in which the HMO plan provided full insurance and the two
following years in which all insured faced the same cost-sharing options. In addition, we have
data for all insured in regular contracts living in the same cities during the same time period.
These insured will serve as our control group.
The data are very reliable in the outcome variable effective health cost (which for simplicity
we treat synonymously to health care expenditures) per year and the chosen insurance contract.
In addition to the total cost, we also use a discretized version indicating the extensive margin,
i.e., the incidence of zero cost. As is often the case with administrative data, there are only a
few control variables available. In the present case, we have age, gender and city of residence.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables. The sample consists of all insured in the
regular or the HMO plan observed over the full three years. This yields a total of 85,626
observations (28,542 insured times 3 years). The fraction of HMO is about 12.5 percent. As
one would expect, the HMO insured generate significantly smaller health costs with about
CHF 1700 per year (fraction of 22% with no cost) as opposed to about CHF 4300 on average
(16% with no cost) for the regularly insured.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
The background characteristics also indicate that the HMO group differs from the regularly
insured, in terms of age, gender, and regional composition. Nevertheless, we will argue below
that the latter group can serve as a suitable control when looking at trends, not levels. Table
2 gives an overview of these trends in mean outcomes by group (HMO vs. regular) and by
year for observation period. Between 2002 and 2003, average health care expenditures for the
HMO group slightly decreased (from CHF 1678 to CHF 1563) whereas that for the regularly
insured increased by almost CHF 400. The fraction of zero cost increased by about 9%-points
for HMO, and it stayed about constant for the regularly insured.
— Insert Table 2 about here —
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The 2002/03 changes for HMO possibly reflect the switch from full insurance to cost-
sharing. On the other hand, the 2003/04 comparison can help us to evaluate our identification
strategy, because all insured faced the same cost-sharing instruments. We observe that the
fraction of zero cost is higher for HMO as opposed to regular in these two years, as one
would expect, but the fraction stays about constant for both groups from 2003 to 2004. And
even though the cost increase for the regularly insured is almost twice as large as for the
HMO insured, in terms of growth rates we observe similar changes (+23.8% for HMO as
opposed to +22.5% for regular).2 Figure 1 illustrates these developments in terms of the
entire expenditure distribution. For better readability, we show the distribution of the log of
expenditures plus one.3 For the regularly insured, we observe small movements in the upper
half of the distribution (which explain the positive shift in means). For the HMO insured, the
graphs look very similar comparing 2003 and 2004. The striking difference for HMO arises in
the 2002 to 2003 comparison with the shift at the extensive margin.
— Insert Figure 1 about here —
4 Econometrics
To formalize the comparisons (and underlying assumptions) of the previous section in a po-
tential outcomes framework, we now introduce our econometric model. It is based on variants
of the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. The basic idea of DID is that the effect of full
health insurance for HMO can be estimated by a comparison of the 2002 and 2003 outcomes for
that group, net of the time trend in a suitable control group (see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)
for an overview of DID methods). We have to deal with two complications, however. First, in
2Re-analyzing the CSS data for the time period 2003-2006 as used in Trottmann et al. (2012) we find
strong evidence for the common growth assumption. The difference between log mean expenditures of regular
insurance and HMO insurance is roughly constant over the years, while the difference between mean expenditures
is increasing (conditional on staying within the initially chosen health plan).
3Using the log transform here is without consequence for our later analysis because Figure 1 is purely
descriptive and for the purpose of illustration of the changes in the outcome distribution.
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reaction to the changes in cost-sharing for HMO, some insured may either have changed their
plan, or left CSS for another insurance company. This behavior may affect the composition of
the treatment and control groups, which would invalidate the DID identification assumptions.
We address this potential selection problem in Section 5.1.
Second, there is the issue of the distribution of health cost, which has a large probability
mass at zero. The traditional approach in health economics is to use a two-part model in
which the discrete and the continuous part of the distribution are analyzed separately (Mul-
lahy, 1998; Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004). However, Angrist (2001) argues that in the second
part (conditional on positive cost) the causal effect is not well-defined, essentially because
conditioning on an outcome is not valid in the potential outcomes framework. Furthermore,
in a difference-in-differences context, it is unclear how to apply the two-part model because
both treated and control observations may switch between the two parts across time periods.
For this reason we model the extensive margin (incidence of zero expenditures) as well as the
mean and quantiles of the entire outcome distribution.
4.1 The standard DID model
We consider the standard model in which there are two time periods T ∈ {0, 1} and two groups
G ∈ {0, 1}. The potential outcome without treatment is denoted as Y 0, the potential outcome
with treatment as Y 1. The observed outcome for individual i is given by
Yi = Y
0
i · (1−Di) + Y 1i ·Di, (1)
where Di = Gi ·Ti is the treatment indicator. The treatment effect is defined as τi = Y 1i −Y 0i .
In the standard DID model, the potential outcome without treatment is given by
Y 0i = α+ β · Ti + γ ·Gi + εi, (2)
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where β measures the time effect, γ the group (or selection) effect, and εi represents unobserved
characteristics independent of Gi and Ti. The standard DID estimand, τ
DID, is
τDID =
{
E[Yi|Gi = 1, Ti = 1]− [E[Yi|Gi = 1, Ti = 0]
}
−
{
E[Yi|Gi = 0, Ti = 1]− [E[Yi|Gi = 0, Ti = 0]
}
(3)
which identifies the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT), formally E[τi|Di = 1].
The four expectations are easily estimated by their sample analogues or by regressing the
observed outcome Yi on Ti, Gi and Di. The main identifying assumption is that in absence of
treatment the time trend of Y is the same for the two groups defined by G. It is important
to note that this assumption cannot hold for nonlinear transformations of Y . In the present
context this means that the common trend assumption may either hold in levels or in logs
(growth), but not in both. We come back to this point in Section 4.3.
4.2 The CIC model
Athey and Imbens (2006) propose to generalize the standard DID model. First, they write the
outcome in absence of treatment as
Y 0i = h(Ui, Ti) (4)
where h(u, t) is an increasing function in u. The random variable U represents unobservable
characteristics (e.g., risk aversion, health status). The distribution of U is allowed to vary
across groups, but not over time, i.e., Ui⊥Ti|Gi. Hence, in absence of treatment, an individual
with Ui = u will have the same outcome in a given time period t irrespective of her group
membership. The standard DID model is nested in eq. (4) under linearity assumptions imposed
on Ui = α+ γ ·Gi + εi and on h(u, t) = u+ β · t.
To derive the CIC estimator, denote the four observed outcomes of Y as Ygt. For example,
Y11 is the observed outcome of Y for individuals with g = 1 and t = 1. Assuming these
are the observations receiving the treatment, we have Y11 = Y
1
11, i.e., the observed outcome
corresponds to the potential outcome. The other three observed outcomes, Y00, Y01 and Y10
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are used to estimate the counterfactual outcome Y 011. The cumulative distribution functions
of the observed outcomes Ygt are denoted by Fgt.
The assumptions required for the identification of the CIC model for continuous outcomes
include eq. (4) combined with the time invariance assumption Ui⊥Ti|Gi. To illustrate the
idea of the CIC model, consider an individual in the treatment group (g = 1) prior to the
treatment (t = 0), whose observed outcome is y. Let F10(y) = q. Given the CIC assumptions,
this individual would have the same y if it were in the control group instead. Hence, the rank
of this individual in the distribution of Y00 is given by F00(y) = q
′. Because the distribution of
U is independent of time, the second period outcome of an individual with Ui = u in absence
of treatment is the q′-quantile of F01. Formally,
y′ = F−101 (F00(y)) (5)
y′ is the estimate of the counterfactual outcome without treatment for a treatment group
observation with pre-treatment outcome y. The counterfactual distribution of Y 011, denoted by
F 011(y), is given by
F 011(y) = F10
(
F−100 (F01(y))
)
(6)
Now, the CIC estimand for the average treatment effect τCIC can be written as
τCIC = E[Y 111]− E[Y 011] = E[Y11]− E[(F−101 (F00(Y10))] (7)
The corresponding quantile treatment effects at quantile q are given by
τCICq = F
1
11
−1
(q)− F 011
−1
(q) = F−111 (q)− F
−1
01 (F00(F
−1
10 (q))) (8)
For additional details see Athey and Imbens (2006). Note that the described estimator is for
continuous outcomes and requires that h(u, t) is strictly increasing in u. Treatment effects for
discrete outcomes are are not point identified in the CIC framework. Athey and Imbens (2006)
derive bounds for these cases. They show that the estimator described above corresponds to
the lower bound of the treatment effect in the case of discrete outcomes.
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4.3 Estimation model
In our baseline model, we focus on individuals who remain in their insurance plan throughout
the observation period. For this reason, we do not need to condition on individual character-
istics like age, gender and region of residence. Their effects are absorbed in the group effect.
The DID estimates are obtained from the following general specification
E[Yi|Gi, T 02i , T 04i ] = m
(
α+ β1T
02
i + β2T
04
i + γGi + δ1Gi · T 02i + δ2Gi · T 04i
)
(9)
where Gi = 1 denotes membership in the HMO plan, T
02 and T 04 are dummies for 2002 and
2004, and 2003 is used as the base year. Note that this setup forms a “reversed” difference-in-
differences design in which the treatment (full insurance) takes place in the first period (2002).
In periods 2 and 3, treated and control face identical cost-sharing incentives.
The average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) is calculated as
ATT 2002−2003 = m(α+ β1 + γ + δ1)−m(α+ β1 + γ) (10)
This gives the average causal effect of having full health insurance on Yi (health expenditures
and incidence of zero cost) for the HMO group. The placebo effect (PE) is calculated as
PE2004−2003 = m(α+ β2 + γ + δ2)−m(α+ β2 + γ) (11)
The placebo effect serves as a test of our identification strategy. Since both the treatment
and the control group face identical cost-sharing options in 2003 and 2004, the placebo effect
should be zero, which can be formally tested.
The specification of m(·) depends on the outcome considered. For the zero cost indicator,
the linear index is fully saturated, and hence we estimate the model by OLS with m(·) the
identity function. The left-hand side of eq. (9) corresponds to the probability of having zero
health costs in this case (denoted by P (0) below), and the coefficients on the interaction terms,
δ1 and δ2, are the ATT of having full insurance and the placebo effect, respectively.
For the effect of full health insurance on total expenditures (including the zeros) the spec-
ification of m(·) is more subtle. Given that the common trend assumption cannot be fulfilled
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in say levels and growth rates, the specification of m(·) is critical for the validity of the as-
sumption. In a first step, we use the traditional specification for m(·), the identity function,
which yields the common linear DID model. In the second specification, and to avoid the log
transformation of the dependent variable (which would require some arbitrary assumptions
for the observations with zero expenditures), we choose a generalized linear model (GLM), in
which m(·) = exp(·). In this case, we estimate eq. (9) by quasi maximum likelihood assuming
a Poisson distribution. Gourieroux et al. (1984) have shown that this estimator is consistent
if the mean function is correctly specified (see also Wooldridge (2010)). We use the placebo
effect as a device to decide upon the preferred specification of m(·).
Estimation of the CIC model does not require the specification of m(·), and the quantities
in eqs. (7) and (8) can be estimated fully nonparametrically. The CIC model can therefore be
used as an additional check for the specification of m(·) in the parametric alternatives.
5 Results
5.1 Selection out of HMO
Restricting the baseline sample to stayers in their plan over the full three years implies that
the group effect accounts for all individual time-constant background. Common changes over
time are captured by the time effect. Moreover, within the stayer sample the independence
assumption U⊥T |G in the CIC model seems very plausible due to the short panel structure of
the data, i.e., the distribution of unobserved factors like health status or preferences likely re-
mains constant within group (HMO or regular insurance) over the three years. The restriction
to stayers affected 1.96% of the total sample, or 1,686 out of the 85,626 observations.4 Even
though this fraction is relatively low, we evaluate whether selection out of HMO may pose a
problem to the external validity of our results, i.e., whether the selection is in any way related
to the introduction of cost-sharing in HMO.
4Table A1 in the appendix shows the summary statistics for the restricted stayer sample. The statistics are
very similar to those in the full sample in Table 1.
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Table 3 shows that out of the 4,909 insured in HMO in 2002, 84% stayed in HMO, 6.7%
switched to the regular plan, and 9.3% switched out of CSS. Similar numbers are observed
for the switching from 2003 to 2004. We then estimated a standard multinomial logit (MNL)
model for the outcomes stay in HMO, switch to regular plan, and switch out of CSS for the
2002/03 and 2003/04 samples. The covariates are gender, age, city of residence, and lagged
health costs. Table 3 shows the marginal/discrete probability effects for the three outcomes.
The numbers show by how much the probability of observing any of the outcomes changes with
a unit change in the regressor. For example, the estimate -0.107 for Basel can be interpreted
as a 10.7%-points smaller probability of staying in HMO for those living in region Basel as
opposed to the base region Zurich. Since many of the probability effects are statistically
significant, the results suggest an endogenous selection out of HMO. However, important for
our identification strategy is whether the pattern of effects changed from 2002/03 to 2003/04.
Comparing the MNL model results in the two samples, there is little evidence that the selection
is systematically related to the introduction of cost-sharing in HMO, i.e., the probability effects
in Table 3 do not significantly differ between the 2002/03 and 2003/04 samples.
— Insert Table 3 about here —
Hence, we conclude that overall there is little evidence that would suggest that the intro-
duction of cost-sharing in HMO caused different selection mechanisms than we would observe
otherwise. For our DID/CIC analysis this implies that restricting the sample to stayers within
their plans is a reasonable choice for the baseline sample. Any impact that we find in the
2002/03 comparison can then be attributed to having full insurance in HMO.
5.2 Impact of full insurance on health cost
Table 4 displays the main results of the paper. Consider first the estimates of the effect
of full insurance on total expected health cost in the DID models (columns 1 and 2). The
linear model specification predicts an increase in health cost of about CHF 440 per year for
13
the HMO insured when having full health insurance. By contrast, the GLM model with an
exponential specification only predicts a change of about CHF 230. The difference in these
two predictions is statistically significant, and the question is which model, if any, provides an
unbiased estimate of the causal effect of full insurance.
— Insert Table 4 about here —
Ultimately, this depends on whether the common trend assumption seems more plausible
for one or the other specification. In judging that we use the “control” year 2004 and evaluate
the estimates of the placebo effect. In the linear specification, we find a significant negative
placebo effect. In the exponential model, the placebo effect is close to zero and statistically
insignificant. The latter is what we would expect, a priori, because both groups (HMO and
regularly insured) face identical cost-sharing options in 2003 and 2004. Moreover, the simple
descriptive comparisons of Table 2 suggest that a constant growth rate in health cost by group
is more reasonable in our data than a linear trend. Hence, the results support that the GLM
model gives an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of full insurance, while the linear DID
model likely does not fulfill the common trend assumption. This conclusion is also supported
by the results of the CIC model (which is invariant to monotonic transformations of the cost
variable) and the results for the extensive margin.
The mean effect in the CIC model (column 4) is very close to the DID estimate in the
GLM model. In addition, we confirm the zero placebo effect. Regarding the extensive margin
(column 3), the placebo effect is zero, too. The effect on the likelihood of generating no cost
is about -0.073, which implies that having full insurance increases the probability of having
positive cost by about 7.3%-points for the HMO insured. The effect is both statistically
significant and economically important. Given that the fraction of positive cost in the HMO
group in 2003 is about 75%, the effect corresponds to an increase of almost 10%.
The results in Table 4 focus on the average effects of having full health insurance on
mean expenditures and on the extensive margin of the HMO group. In addition to that, the
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CIC model allows us to estimate the effects of full health insurance on the entire outcome
distribution by looking at quantiles. Figure 2 shows the CIC effects for the 0.05 to 0.85
quantiles for the impact of full insurance on the HMO group (left graph), and the placebo
effect (right graph). The placebo effect is zero over the entire distribution, as we would
expect. There is no effect of having full insurance below the 0.2 quantile (because that part
of the outcome distribution does not change). The effect is positive and almost constant in
absolute terms at around CHF 100 to 150 above the 0.2 quantile. In relative terms, the CIC
effects are decreasing over the outcome distribution. The CIC effects become insignificant
above the 0.7 quantile and are rather noisy for the upper tail of the distribution.
— Insert Figure 2 about here —
To put the effects of having full insurance into perspective, we calculate price elasticities
from the numbers obtained above. The usual formula for the coefficient of price elasticity
relates the change in demand (here measured by health expenditures) to a marginal change
in the price. Since having full insurance implies a zero price, the traditional formula is not
applicable. Instead, we use the concept of an arc elasticity where the percentage change in
demand is related to the percentage change in the price:5
Ed =
% change in Q
% change in P
=
Qfull−Qcost
Qcost
Pfull−Pcost
Pcost
= −
Qfull −Qcost
Qcost
(12)
Qfull denotes health care expenditures under full insurance, Qcost denotes expenditures under
the cost-sharing regime (analogous for prices Pfull and Pcost in the denominator). Numbers in
the numerator can be extracted from our estimates in Table 4, e.g., for the DID effect in the
GLM model we can calculate 232.6/1563.9 ≈ 0.148, which is relative to the 2003 average in the
HMO group (see Table 2).6 The idea then is to compare the zero price under full insurance to
the price Pcost under cost-sharing. This yields a denominator of -1, independent of the value
5We do not use the arc elasticity with respect to the midpoint, as in Aron-Dine et al. (2013), but to average
expenditures and prices under the cost-sharing regime, which we deem more reasonable in our case. Using arc
elasticities the denominator would be doubled to -2.
6In fact, the GLM model allows us to approximate the numerator directly by extracting the estimate of δ1
in eq. (9) from the estimation output.
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of Pcost , i.e., the price elasticity is -0.148. Regarding the mean effect in the CIC model, we
obtain a price elasticity of about -0.124, close to the elasticity in the GLM model.
For the quantile CIC effects, the elasticities range from an almost unit elasticity for the 0.3
quantile of the cost distribution to an elasticity of about -0.1 for the 0.7 quantile. Intuitively,
this is what we would expect because introducing a cost-sharing element to basic health in-
surance will most likely affect individuals in the lower ranges of the cost distribution, who
possibly save an optional check-up, but hardly influences those in the upper range.
In a secondary analysis (detailed results are available upon request), we estimated GLM
models conditional on low (CHF 230) and high (CHF 1200 or 1500) deductible choices in 2003.
The level of the chosen deductible may be interpreted as an indicator for health status. This
yields an elasticity of -0.11 for the low deductible and -0.57 for the high deductible, consistent
with the CIC results. Since deductible choice is likely endogenous to health care utilization,
however, we do not want to place too much emphasis on these conditional GLM results.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
The results of the previous section are remarkably robust. A first concern could be the re-
striction of the sample to stayers in their health plan over the full observation period. Table
5 shows that when including the switchers in the analysis, the effects remain stable. Since
we have panel data we include individual fixed effects in the DID models to control for time-
constant characteristics, beyond those available in the data (gender, age, and city of residence).
Unfortunately, allowing for fixed effects is not straightforward in the CIC model, but still the
estimates in the full sample are very close to those in the stayer sample. This holds for the
mean as well as the quantile CIC effects (see Figure A1 in the appendix).
— Insert Table 5 about here —
A second concern could be that the mean effects are driven by outliers, i.e., those with
large health costs, or severe health problems. We have information about whether a hospital
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stay occurred in the past year. Excluding those from the sample hardly affects our results. In
the same way, excluding the top 1% of the cost distribution has little impact.
A last concern from the results in Table 3 could be that there is regional heterogeneity. In
particular, we find some weakly significant differences (p-value 0.074) between the 2002/03 and
2003/04 samples in the MNL models that are driven by the switching out of HMO behavior
in Berne. When we exclude those insured from the sample, then the estimated effects are a
bit smaller, but still in the order of Table 4. Overall, we conclude that our results are not very
sensitive to these changes in the baseline sample, and that our DID/CIC estimates provide
robust evidence of the effect of full insurance on health expenditures.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Ellis (2012) in his recent presidential address to the American Society of Health Economists
asked five questions. The final one was concerned with the behavioral aspects of economics,
and the psychological effect of a zero price in particular. He argues that the incentives played
by a zero price are fundamentally different from any positive price. Having full health insurance
implies a zero price of utilizing health care.7 This in turn, as Ellis (2012) puts it, “liberates
your mind to not even think about cost [p. 231]”. Our paper contributes to the literature by
comparing a managed-care plan with temporary full insurance to a cost-sharing alternative
with deductibles, co-payments, and a stop-loss. We find that having full insurance has a
significant impact on the extensive margin, i.e., on the likelihood to generate costs. Thus,
having to pay for health care services, from the very first visit in the year, has a strong
influence on the consumers’ threshold to generate costs.
Health care demand is more sensitive for the lower cost ranges, with elasticities estimated
about -1.0 at low quantiles of the health cost distribution to -0.1 at higher quantiles. This
finding suggests that primarily low cost patients react to the price change, often reducing
7Of course, there can still be monetary costs of going to the doctor (e.g., cost for transport, lost work time,
etc.), and there are non-monetary costs as well. However, we abstract from these here because we expect that
consumers care most about the price they have to pay for physician services.
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their demand to zero. For the average cost, the elasticity is around -0.14. This estimate is
well in the range of the RAND health insurance experiment and other previous findings. A
recent study for Switzerland using data of the same insurance company is Trottmann et al.
(2012). Transforming their estimates of the moral hazard effects (Table 5 of their paper) into
elasticities gives an estimate -0.33 when individuals with regular contract and high deductible
were to have the basic deductible instead.8
Our results are informative regarding optimal insurance designs. As discussed in Cutler
and Zeckhauser (2000) health insurances are confronted with an inherent trade-off between
risk-sharing and moral hazard. Our results can be interpreted in this light. Permitting con-
sumers the access to health services without any cost will increase utilization significantly,
especially at the extensive margin. Hence, we provide further evidence that cost-sharing in-
struments are an effective tool to reduce overconsumption of medical care (e.g., Newhouse et
al., 1993). However, given that the cost-saving effects are concentrated at the bottom of the
health cost distribution, the overall impact on cost containment may be limited.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics of CSS panel
HMO Regular
Mean SD Mean SD
A. Outcomes
Effective health costs 1723.5 4322.3 4292.5 7854.1
Fraction of zero cost 22.0% 16.1%
B. Background characteristics
Age in 2002 46.9 16.0 56.8 18.3
Female 47.1% 60.9%
Basel 10.5% 14.0%
Berne 14.6% 8.8%
Lucerne 62.7% 32.0%
Zurich 12.2% 45.2%
Number of observations 10,713 74,913
Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: Statistics shown for all individuals observed
over full period 2002-2004. HMO as opposed to regular health care plan. Effective health
costs in Swiss Francs per year. SD = standard deviation.
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Table 2: Comparison of health costs by plan and year
Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004
(1) (2) (3)
A. Effective health costs
HMO 1678.6 1563.9 1936.6
(62.1) (62.1) (90.7)
Regular 3741.3 4102.8 5026.7
(43.4) (46.2) (57.7)
B. Fraction of zero cost
HMO 0.165 0.250 0.249
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Regular 0.162 0.161 0.160
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of observations 28,542 28,542 28,542
Fraction HMO 12.9% 12.5% 12.1%
Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: See notes Table 1. Reported numbers
are means, standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Switching out of HMO - Results of multinomial logit model
2002/03 (1) 2003/04 (2)
Stay Regular Out Stay Regular Out
Age in 2002 0.002** -0.0004 -0.002** 0.002** -0.001* -0.001**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Female -0.001 0.009 -0.008 -0.006 0.011 -0.005
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Basel -0.107** 0.095** 0.012 -0.064** 0.051* 0.013
(0.026) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.021) (0.012)
Berne 0.047** -0.023 -0.024* 0.041** 0.002 -0.043*
(0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.007)
Lucerne 0.063** 0.019 -0.082** 0.043** 0.002 -0.045**
(0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
Log cost previous year -0.005** 0.003 0.002 -0.003* 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 4,124 330 455 3,824 214 265
χ2-statistic (1)=(2) 19.7 (p-value 0.074)
χ2-statistic (1)=(2) 2.26 (p-value 0.994), excluding region Berne
Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: 2002/03 looks at all individuals in HMO in 2002 and their
choice of plan in 2003 (stay in HMO, switch to regular plan, leave CSS insurance), analogous for 2003/04.
Reported numbers are probability effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05.
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences results for HMO versus Regular
DID CIC
Linear GLM P(0) Mean
ATT 2002−2003 436.9** 232.6** -0.073** 193.8**
(80.6) (77.7) (0.009) (70.0)
PE2004−2003 -548.5** 30.2 -0.000 43.0
(90.7) (85.5) (0.009) (64.9)
Number of observations 55,960
Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: 2002-2003 shows impact of full insurance
on health cost using DID/CIC comparisons of cost trends in HMO (no deductible in
2002, deductible in 2003) with cost trends in regular plan (deductibles in both years).
2004-2003 shows placebo effect. Results conditional on not switching plans (between
HMO and regular). Cluster adjusted/bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
(bootstrap based on 500 replications). ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05.
Table 5: Difference-in-differences results – full sample
DID CIC
Linear GLM P(0) Mean
ATT 2002−2003 430.5** 219.4** -0.086** 239.7**
(80.6) (76.1) (0.008) (84.1)
PE2002−2003 -552.7** 33.3 -0.000 56.8
(90.7) (82.5) (0.009) (117.2)
Number of observations 57,084
Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: See notes Table 4. Results including
switchers between health plans. DID models include individual fixed effects. Cluster
adjusted/bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05.
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Table 6: Difference-in-differences sensitivity checks
DID CIC
Linear GLM P(0) Mean
Exlude hospital stayers1 384.3** 254.8** -0.073** 224.8**
(77.3) (74.3) (0.009) (67.3)
Exlude top 1% costs2 414.3** 268.0** -0.073** 225.1**
(58.0) (55.9) (0.009) (49.4)
Exlude Berne3 402.7** 199.9** -0.060** 163.4**
(88.9) (86.3) (0.009) (78.3)
Number of observations 54,6081
54,7042
50,7183
Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: See notes Table 4. DID/CIC effects
for ATT 2002−2003. Results conditional on not switching plans. Cluster adjusted/boot-
strapped standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05.
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of log health costs by plan and year
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Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: Zero deductibles in HMO in 2002, non-zero
deductibles in HMO in 2003/04, and in regular plans for all years.
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Figure 2: Changes-in-changes results for different percentiles
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Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: Horizontal axis: percentile of effective health costs; vertical axis:
CIC estimate of treatment effect. Results conditional on not switching plans (between HMO and regular).
Shaded bars show 95% confidence intervals (based on bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications).
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistics - stayers only
HMO Regular
Mean SD Mean SD
A. Outcomes
Effective health costs 1749.4 4403.3 4317.5 7876.4
Fraction of zero cost 21.9% 16.0%
B. Background characteristics
Age in 2002 47.1 16.1 56.9 18.3
Female 46.8% 61.0%
Basel 9.7% 13.9%
Berne 13.9% 8.8%
Lucerne 63.7% 31.7%
Zurich 12.7% 45.6%
Number of observations 9,852 74,088
Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: See notes Table 1.
Figure A1: Changes-in-changes results – full sample
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Source: CSS panel, own calculations. Notes: See notes Figure 2. Results are shown for full
sample, i.e., including switchers between health plans.
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